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Environmental Aesthetics Beyond
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Deconstructing the Myth of Pristine Nature
Antony Fredriksson
abstract  In this paper I want to scrutinize one of the key ideas within mod-
ern Western aesthetics. Beauty is often considered to derive from a virtuous 
disinterested attitude towards nature. This kind of view has been advocated 
by thinkers such as Shaftesbury and Kant in the beginning of the so-called 
aesthetic turn in philosophy. The problem with this view is that it presupposes 
that nature exists by itself before human intervention in a kind of ideal pris-
tine state. My hypothesis is that this ideal of pristine nature constitutes one of 
the underlying problems of many contemporary environmental discourses.
keywords Pristine nature, culture, natural beauty, disinterestedness, sub-
lime, picturesque
‘Things which have a nature in themselves’ – a dogmatic idea, which must be 
absolutely abandoned.1
–Friedrich Nietzsche
In two chalk drawings German artist Jürgen Stollhans expresses a di-
chotomy in our attitudes toward natural and urban landscapes. In the 
first drawing we see a forest grove and the caption Orientierungsphase 
(orientation phase). In the second one we see an urban view with a side-
walk, a façade of a house, an iron fence and the caption Leitsystem (guid-
ing system). What comes to my mind when thinking about these images 
and captions is a categorical divide between the natural, un-designed 
environ ment and the urban designed and predetermined space. A natu-
ral environment is a place where our movement is dependent on orienta-
tion. There is no predetermined way in which to move about. For each 
new place we have to decide how to move forward, which turns we can 
take, how to cross streams, cliffs or thick groves etc. Our relationship to 
such an environment is of course also dependent on our experience. Some 
people have a more thorough knowledge of the natural environment and 
a more direct contact with it and dependency on it than others. But still, 
nature is unique in the sense that it is not designed by us. By contrast, a 
designed environment is in this respect already predetermined. A fence 
is built in order to hinder our entry and the street-plan of a city is drawn 
according to a certain logic of movement. In this way we are, at least to 
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some extent, guided by the cityscape. In nature, a hindrance is not there 
in order to stop or limit our movement; it is not intentional or rational, 
or it cannot be understood as intentional and rational in the same way 
as the planned cityscape. Now this is not necessarily Jürgen Stollhans 
point; I interpret quite freely what the drawings actually address. But 
to my mind this interpretation comes quite naturally to our sensibility 
since this divide between natural and anthropomorphic environment 
plays, I would claim, a key role in our modern culture. 
What struck me with Stollhans work when I first saw it at the Docu-
menta 12 exhibition in Kassel, Germany, in 2007, was how it made a brief 
but poignant statement about our modern predicament. It made sense 
to me as a comment on the domesticating effect that the designed en-
vironment of the cityscape sometimes has on us. This comment seems 
appropriate to me, but when given a second thought, this idea of the 
divide between the designed and the un-designed also has a backside: 
What still puzzles me is how this idea of a designed environment mysti-
fies the natural. When nature is juxtaposed to the designed environment 
that we to a large extent live in, it starts to become un-intelligible. Does 
the fact that natural environments are not designed by us also entail that 
they are beyond our desires, our will, our interests and our intentions, 
that they are somehow un-human? And what could this possibly mean? 
This division between nature and culture is a central component of 
modern aesthetics. The concept of disinterest that announces itself dur-
ing the 18th century in the philosophy of Lord Shaftesbury and that is 
later adapted by Kant, signifies exactly this kind of categorical division 
between culture and civilization, governed by our desires and interests, 
and the natural realm that is conceived as a counterpoint, as something 
outside of our human concerns. There is something deeply problematic 
about this categorical division. In this text I want to articulate this dif-
ficulty. If we take this categorical division to be the ontology of environ-
mental aesthetics we end up in a situation in which every intention, in-
terest or expression of our desires in relation to the natural environment 
signifies domestication and exploitation. What the emphasis on dis-
interestedness within aesthetics does with our understanding of nature 
is that it makes us forget the whole history of our natural life-form. As 
Jakob Meloe points out, the concept of life-form appears in the philoso-
phy of Ludwig Wittgenstein as a replacement for the positivistic idea 
of the given.2 In this Wittgensteinian view our concept of nature and 
our relationship with it, is determined by how we live our lives, on our 
practices and actions, and on how we situate ourselves within it. Nature 
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Jürgen Stollhans: “Orientierungsphase – Tafeln”, 2007, 
White chalk on one-coat paint on plywood. 
Jürgen Stollhans: “Leitsystem – Tafeln”, 2007, White chalk 
on one-coat paint on plywood.
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is not something that our culture rests upon, culture is not a human ve-
neer that is applied upon a ready-made, given nature. Meloe also sees a 
parallel to the Heideggerian concept of being-in-the-world. Meloe writes: 
“The original concept of a thing is that of a zeug, a stone to throw, a stick 
to dig with, a cave to seek shelter in.”3 In this way natural objects are 
determined by our use of them; their meaning does not reside in the 
things themselves. In this sense nature is an integral part of our culture, 
or if you will, culture is a part of nature. The natural environment is and 
has been the locus of our actions, our dwelling and essentially our home. 
How then could we relate to it without interest?
It seems we cannot get rid of the concept of pristine nature since it 
plays an important role in our understanding of environments that are 
not designed by us, but it is crucial to understand this difference be-
tween the designed and the undesigned correctly. The idea of the natural 
has been the fundament for philosophy, science and aesthetics from the 
17th century onward, but as philosophers like Wittgenstein, Heidegger, 
Merleau -Ponty and Nietzsche have pointed out this idea has also over-
shadowed essential aspects of our common life. Nietzsche writes: “The 
world, apart from the fact that we have to live in it – the world, which we 
have not adjusted to our being, our logic and our psychological prejudices 
– does not exist as a world ‘in-itself’; it is essentially a world of relations.”4 
If we think of nature as an environment where our interests, our cultural 
and social life, do not come into play, then we position ourselves outside 
of nature. This kind of positioning has not led to a deeper understanding 
or appreciation of nature; rather it has entailed an alienation from it. Or, 
to put it another way this kind of understanding of the natural, of nature 
as it exists in its pristine state, should be considered as a symptom of a 
certain historical transformation in our attitudes toward our environ-
ment, not as a return to the natural. 
In this essay I want to give a brief account of why the idea of pris-
tine nature enters the Western frame of mind in the transition between 
romanticism and modernity and of how this concept is internally re-
lated to the concepts of the sublime and the picturesque within aesthet-
ics. Secondly, I want to find another way of addressing the puzzlement 
that arises when we think of nature as an “unconditional thing.”5 This 
puzzle ment depends on a preconception that inhabits our understand-
ing of nature. In order to get to grips with this puzzlement I will present 
Jacob Meloe’s account of the life-form of fishermen in Northern Norway. 
Meloe’s example of the concept of a “natural harbour” dissolves the divi-
sion between nature and culture, object and concept. It calls into ques-
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tion the traditional philosophical understanding of nature as a pristine, 
un-designed, unconditional, nonhuman and sublime entity. 
From the Sublime to the Picturesque
In her book Fiction in the Age of Photography Nancy Armstrong attends 
to the development of British realism during the end of the romantic 
and the beginning of the modern era. She sees the turn between the 18th 
and 19th century as a rupture in certain aesthetic and economic concepts 
within English literature and consequently in the English mindset. The 
pivotal point in this discussion was the ontology of the image, i.e. the 
relationship between representation (image, description) and the object 
(nature, the natural).6 The transformation of the English landscape that 
occurred during the 18th and 19th century was dependent on a new eco-
nomic, aesthetic and epistemological order that stemmed from a society 
that no longer lives directly off the land. Up to a certain point in history 
the landscape that was formed by agriculture gave the impression of 
wealth and prosperity, whereas untouched pristine natural sites were 
considered to be wastelands. But in order to be able to consider them-
selves a purely modern nation, the Victorians took one step further in 
their attitudes toward the natural. In a society that considered itself more 
prosperous than the past generations, the wastelands became a sign of 
transcending the dependency on natural resources. Wastelands became 
desirable even to the extent that landscaping practices were developed 
in order to conceal the former rural agricultural landscape. Nature was 
brought back to its “original” state in order to convey prosperity.7 Dur-
ing this time the idea of nature as pristine or untouched becomes an 
aesthetic ideal. 
William Cronon attends to this same development in his essay The 
Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature. He de-
scribes how the concept of the sublime enters into the European intellec-
tual culture of the 18th century as a central idea of the romantic mindset. 
A related but more specific ideological construct that Cronon takes up as 
part of this development is the myth of the frontier. For American intel-
lectuals like Theodore Roosevelt and Owen Wister the frontier signified 
the opposite of civilization. Ironically, this mythology was created by 
an elite that did not have to face nature on a daily basis or depend on it 
directly in order to survive. For these people nature was a site for recre-
ation and leisure time activities, not for productive labor. The most tragic 
consequence that Cronon takes up in order to emphasize the paradox in 
the myth of the frontier is how the movement that originally strived to 
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found national parks in which nature was preserved in its “virginal” state, 
drove the Native American population out of their homes into reserva-
tions. The people who actually considered nature to be their home were 
forcefully moved so that the natural reserves would appear untouched.8 
This venture reveals a form of self-deception in which advocates of a 
culture that has become alienated from nature destroy another culture’s 
harmonious coexistence with it. In this ideology, nature is given the part 
of that which is the opposite of civilization; it was considered to be the 
“unfallen antithesis of an unnatural civilization that has lost its soul.”9 
The important point that Cronon makes is that we have to keep in mind 
that wilderness, pristine nature or the natural, are ideas that belong to a 
specific cultural development. He writes of wilderness: 
It is not a pristine sanctuary where the last remnant of an untouched, en-
dangered, but still transcendent nature can for at least a little while longer 
be encountered without the contaminating taint of civilization. Instead, it’s 
a product of that civilization, and could hardly be contaminated by the very 
stuff of which it is made.10 
In order for us to understand the difficulties that we have with the no-
tions of wilderness or pristine nature, we have to understand how these 
concepts entered the aesthetic discourse. Cronon writes: “To gain such a 
remarkable influence, the concept of wilderness had to become loaded 
with the deepest core values of the culture that created and idealized it: 
it had to become sacred.”11 In contrast to a world and a space that become 
more and more a product of human design, more and more rationalized 
and controlled, nature’s wildness, its un-veneered appeal, was uplifted to 
the status of sacred, to an ideal. This is why, at a certain point in history, 
the sublime became a necessary concept that was used in order to articu-
late a certain understanding of nature. One important aspect of the idea 
of the sublime is that it celebrates the un-describable beauty of nature. 
For the romantic artist nature is unsoiled by cultural values and inter-
pretations. Whereas an image is a result of human design, nature holds 
a position beyond the anthropomorphic; it is a world prior to design. 
In this line of thought every effort to mimic natural beauty in images 
is a futile attempt to domesticate nature and this intention will by itself 
denigrate natural beauty. William Wordsworth, among others, describes 
nature as a realm beyond interpretation. According to him all descrip-
tions, poetry and imagery, lend their beauty from the sublime – from the 
authentic, pristine nature. For Wordsworth, the beauty of an image or 
poem originates from the sublime experience that nature evokes in the 
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observer.12 Nature has the capacity to inspire the artist and in this way in-
fluence his works of art, but art cannot reproduce natural beauty. In this 
way the beauty of nature is not reducible to visual or pictorial content. It 
does not reside in the picturesque, but in the contemplative attitude that 
nature evokes in man. Here it is notable that this relationship between 
nature and the singular man is contrasted to the common, human world 
of culture and society. Wordsworth writes about how a man “in monkish 
times”13 became allured to feel at home in places that permit a contempla-
tive attitude.
Cronon points out how this romantic attitude is actually more related 
to something supernatural than to the natural. For Wordsworth, nature 
is not only capable of evoking feelings of beauty and pleasure in the 
observer. It can also arouse awe and dismay. Cronon quotes a passage 
in which Henry David Thoreau, Wordsworth’s 19th century follower, ex-
presses his admiration for Mount Katahdin, as follows: “This ground is 
not prepared for you. Is it not enough that I smile in the valleys? I have 
never made this soil for thy feet, this air for thy breathing, these rocks for 
thy neighbors.”14 In this sense the concept of the sublime is not necessar-
ily determined only by the positive feelings that it evokes, but, rather, by 
the mystical presence of something that is beyond our comprehension. 
At the turn of the 18th century this ideal of the sublime, of the sacred, 
indescribable beauty of nature, starts to transform into its mirror image. 
The picturesque becomes the ideal of beauty. The conception of nature 
as sublime, its power to arouse wonder and contemplation, its beauty 
beyond utility and interest gives way to a new aesthetic order in which 
the formal or pictorial beauty of nature becomes paramount. Whereas 
the aesthetics of the sublime states that the beauty of the image derives 
from nature, the aesthetics of the picturesque postulates that the image 
gives value to the object.15 According to William Gilpin, who can be con-
sidered the key figure behind the idea of the picturesque, the value of an 
image is dependent on its composition and in this way he invites the idea 
of a standard of taste. Aesthetic value starts to correlate with economic 
value, and the desirability of a certain image becomes dependent on its 
design, rather than its subject-matter.16 In this transition to modernity, 
natural beauty becomes commoditized. This development has very real 
consequences, not only for the understanding of landscapes during this 
time, but also in that it entails a venture in which the natural landscape 




This change in the poles of the debate over the picturesque marks a change in 
the status of the visual representation itself. […] a sketch or painting of the taste-
fully positioned and appointed country house became something more than a 
representation of a piece of rural property. That image had been instrumental-
ized. Rather than simply reproducing the visible surface of a particularly well-
textured landscape as Gilpin had proposed, the image began to behave like a 
plan or model, capable of bringing the landscape in line with a visual standard. 
[…] At the point when the model precedes its material realization, it is fair to 
say that the copy has replaced the original. Thus the English landscape began 
to copy art almost a century before Oscar Wilde called attention to the fact.17
It is this change of orientation that gives way to the development that 
often is perceived as modernity’s rationalization and aesthetization of 
both rural and urban space. The concept of image plays a key role in 
this transformation since the image is both a way of fixating a certain 
view, so that it can be scrutinized aesthetically, and a means of making 
models according to which the natural world can be categorized and 
re-organized. In the beginning of the 18th century Lord Shaftesbury 
wrote: “never to admire the Representative-Beauty, except for the sake 
of the Original; nor aim at other Enjoyment than of the rational kind.”18 
At the beginning of the 19th century, representation had transcended 
the task of copying the given natural world in order to appreciate the 
qualities of the original. Representation, in the era of the picturesque, 
referred to a way of transforming the natural and subjugating it to 
human design. This way of interfering with nature stands in stark con-
trast to Wordsworth’s contemplative romantic attitude. Modernity sig-
nifies a change in the aesthetic order that completely leaves the ideal of 
contemplation behind.
Although my ethos in this text is anti-romantic, my aim is not to de-
fend modernity. The way in which the ideal of the picturesque stands 
as a mirror image to the ideal of the sublime reveals how both of these 
concepts are inhabited by a similar problem in that they both point out 
an ideal position from which nature can be looked upon. In the first case 
of the sublime, the spectator looks upon the nonhuman realm in contem-
plation, in the second case of the picturesque the spectator looks upon 
the nonhuman realm, through preconceived models. Both of these atti-
tudes hold an ideal distance to nature. Whether we talk about nature as 
sublime, untouched or sacred, or whether we conceive it as a playground 
for economic and purely formal aesthetic interests, the moral question 
concerning our place in nature is not addressed. Our involvement and 
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relationship with nature goes beyond the generic dualism of a contem-
plative attitude in which nature is inhabited by a sublime beauty and 
a modern venture of commoditization and exploitation. Our life-form 
is by necessity adjusted to nature; it is conditioned by it. Therefore the 
dialectics of the sublime and the picturesque, of interest as opposed to 
disinterest, does not convey our predicament properly. 
The examples above show how the idealization of the contemplative 
attitude is dependent on a development that suppresses the possibility 
of contemplation. Likewise, the idealization of nature as it exists in its 
pristine state stems from an acceleration of the development in which 
the natural environment is being domesticated by utilitarian and eco-
nomic interests. When the world seems to develop into an environment 
where everything is designed according to the desires of man, a longing 
for the world in its pristine state is awakened. 
Interest and Disinterest
It is against this historical backdrop that we should understand the 
emerg ence of the so-called aesthetic turn within philosophy. This turn 
is commonly understood as the point when the use of the word “aesthet-
ics” as a moniker for an independent field of study within philos ophy is 
coined by Baumgarten in the middle of the 18th century. This is often 
considered the starting point of modern aesthetics. However, one of the 
key concepts that is pivotal for modern aesthetics precedes Baum garten’s 
doctrine. Jerome Stolnitz writes about Lord Shaftesbury: “For he sets into 
motion the idea which more than any other, marks off modern from tradi-
tional aesthetics and around which a great deal of the dialectic of modern 
thought has revolved, viz., the concept of ‘aesthetic disinterestedness’.”19 
This concept of disinterestedness is not only related to a certain current 
within philosophy, it is a reaction to a transformation within a whole 
culture. Preben Mortensen points out how the legacy of Shaftesbury, 
who can be considered one of the last advocates of the classical aesthetic 
tradition,20 should be understood as a reaction against the development 
of a certain economical order in which moral virtue and aesthetic beauty 
are reduced to utility and desirability. Beauty for Shaftesbury, and, later 
on, for Kant, is beyond the realm of desire. When they emphasize the 
importance of the disinterested attitude both scholars express a quite 
real concern. They asses the dangers of an aesthetic understanding in 
which the moral components are excluded. In order to understand this 
view correctly it has to be taken into account that Shaftesbury, when he 
introduces the idea that beauty resides in the disinterested attitude, is 
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actually concerned with a moral question concerning the relationship 
between moral good and aesthetic beauty. As Mortensen points out, 
Shaftesbury “distinguishes between admiring something for its beauty 
and the desire to possess or own it.”21 In this sense beauty cannot be a 
purely aesthetic concept as it is always entwined with moral judgment. 
But peculiarly, moral judgment is defined negatively as being obtainable 
through the lack of interest and intention. In order for something to be 
purely beautiful, one has to regard it without a desire to possess it. From 
this distinction Shaftesbury infers a significant difference between natu-
ral beauty and the beauty of man-made design. Shaftesbury is adamant 
on the point that man-made structures and artifacts lack the beauty and 
sublimity of natural structures and environments. He writes:
Your Genius, the Genius of the Place, and the GREAT GENIUS have at last, I 
think, prevail’d. I shall no longer resist the passion growing in me for Things 
of a natural kind, where neither Art, nor Conceit or Caprice of Man has spoil’d 
the genuine Order, by altering any thing in their primitive State. Even the rude 
Rocks, the mossy Caverns, the irregular unwrought Grotto’s, and broken Falls 
of Waters, with all the horrid Graces of the Wilderness it self, as represent-
ing Nature more, will be the more engaging, and appear with a Magnificence 
beyond the formal Mockery of Princely Gardens.22
The mockery that Shaftesbury refers to derives from the futility of the 
attempt to copy natural beauty - the point being that human attempts to 
copy the splendor of nature will always fall short: They can never grasp 
the beauty of the original, since they are inhabited by human desire, will, 
intention and interest. The effort to succumb the view of a landscape to 
one’s interest is morally corrupt even on the level of sense perception. 
Only the disinterested observer can grasp nature as it truly is in its pris-
tine state. Here is the inherent tension in the ideal of the disinterested 
observer, since although it is described as a lack of desire and intention, 
it is still an attitude. It is something that the observer is morally account-
able for. 
Also for Kant, desire and beauty, economy and aesthetics are funda-
mental opposites. In his Critique of Aesthetic Judgment Kant formulates 
this as follows: “We call that good for something (useful) which only 
pleases as a means; but that which pleases on its own account we call 
good in itself.”23 In this sense our experience of beauty differs from mere 
desire. In the specific case of experience of beauty, we are in a disinterest-
ed state, without desire, without goals and without agency. He writes: 
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All one wants to know is whether the mere representation of the object is to my 
liking, no matter how indifferent I may be to the real existence of the object of 
this representation. It is quite plain that in order to say that the object is beauti-
ful, and to show that I have taste, everything turns on the meaning which I can 
give to this representation, and not on any factor which makes me dependent 
on the real existence of the object. Every one must allow that a judgment on 
the beautiful which is tinged with the slightest interest, is very partial and not 
a pure judgement of taste.24
Pure beauty resides in the purely aesthetic or a pure judgment of taste: 
no desires or interest should be involved, since these depend on the ac-
tual thing in the world. Here, Kant is concerned with exactly the same 
issue as Shaftesbury, however, one of his conclusions is the exact op-
posite. Whereas Shaftesbury accepts representation only for its power 
to remind us of the original, Kant disqualifies this comparison on the 
grounds that the longing for the original thing in the world reveals our 
desire to possess and utilize it. Both are rightfully concerned about a de-
velopment in which beauty is reduced to desirability and utility. Neither 
of them accepts the idea that the experience of beauty can be described 
in economic or utilitarian terms. But there is still something about Kant’s 
categorical claim about the purity of aesthetic judgment that, I think, 
leads us astray. What bothers me is the idea that we could make these 
categorical divisions without losing something in the process. When we 
try to imagine what kind of person this disinterested Shaftesburian or 
Kantian observer would be like, it becomes clear that such a person could 
not feel particularly at home in nature, since, as Cronon points out: “Call-
ing a place home inevitably means that we will use the nature we find 
in it […].”25 If this sense of home is what gets sidestepped or lost in the 
aesthetic theory of disinterestedness, that is, if the concept of disinterest 
simply is a symptom of alienation from nature, then it is hard to under-
stand how this concept could have any merit in philosophy.
The problem with this view held by Shaftesbury and Kant is that in 
their reluctance toward human will and interest, they make up a categori-
cal division which fails to describe how our desires and interests actually 
manifest themselves. The natural environment is and has been the locus 
of our actions, our dwelling and essentially our home. It is defined by our 
relation to it and this definition is never a one-sided affair. 
One of the most successful critiques of the idea of disinterestedness can 
be found in Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism. According to Nietzsche, Kant’s 
distinction between our understanding of things and the things as they are 
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in themselves depends on a fundamental mistake. Even if things could be 
said to exist by themselves prior to our understanding of them and beyond 
our desires, then they could by necessity not be known. He writes:
Something unconditioned cannot be known: otherwise it would not be uncon-
ditioned! […] Knowing means: “to place one’s self in relation with something”, 
to feel one’s self conditioned by something and one’s self conditioning it – un-
der all circumstances, then, it is a process of making stable or fixed, of defining, 
of making conditions conscious (not a process of sounding things, creatures or 
objects “in-themselves”.26
What Nietzsche discovers is not only the incomprehensibility of the no-
tion of “the-thing-in-itself.” Furthermore, Nietzsche points out how knowl-
edge is in the becoming, it is a result of a certain action and dependent on 
relation, not a fulfillment of a predetermined intention driven by desire. 
In this way our knowledge is dependent on interactions with the world, be 
it a natural or a manmade environment. Our knowledge of nature is not a 
contact with a given truth, it is dependent on how we position ourselves. 
Merleau-Ponty develops a similar line of argument when he writes:
The physics of relativity confirms that absolute and final objectivity is a mere 
dream showing how each particular observation is strictly linked to the location 
of the observer and cannot be abstracted from this particular situation; it also 
rejects the notion of an absolute observer. We can no longer flatter ourselves with 
the idea that, in science, the exercise of a pure and unsituated intellect can allow 
us to gain access to an object free of all human traces, just as God would see it.27
The Environment as Home
If we think of nature as authentic, pristine or untouched we easily end up 
mystifying our relationship to our environment. The fixation on disinter-
estedness, the sublime, beauty and taste, and on the pure and authentic 
during the 18th century is a very particular way of understanding nature. 
In the following I will try to draw an outline of a different understand-
ing of our relationship to nature that calls into question the ideal of the 
disinterested observer. Merleu-Ponty writes:
They [empiricists] hide from us in the first place ‘the cultural world’ or ‘human 
world’ in which nevertheless almost our whole life is led. For most of us, Nature 
is no more than a vague and remote entity, overlaid by cities, roads, houses and 
above all by the presence of other people.28 
And:
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In the footsteps of science and painting, philosophy and above all, psychology 
seem to have woken up to the fact that our relationship to space is not that of 
a pure disembodied subject to a distant object but rather that of a being which 
dwells in space relating to its natural habitat.29 
What these quotations by Merleau-Ponty aim at is that our relation to our 
environment, be it urban or rural, is in our everyday experience a relation 
of being embodied and at home in the world. We do not look at the world, 
but in the world; we are not detached from it. One way of articulating 
this kind of relationship can be found in Jakob Meloe’s essay The Two 
Landscapes of Northern Norway on the concept of a “natural harbour” and 
in the significance this concept has for seafaring people. Meloe is a Nor-
wegian philosopher who has lived in the rural northern part of Norway 
most of his life among traditional cultures of reindeer-herders and fisher-
men. He has dedicated much of his philosophy to the problems concern-
ing preservation of traditional forms of life in northern Norway.
When we ask; “what is a natural harbour?” and “how do we determine 
that a place is suitable as a natural harbour?” we are engaged in a certain 
philosophical tension between concept and object. Is it our concept of a 
harbour projected on to a natural landscape? Or is it a natural landscape 
that creates our concept of the harbour? Meloe’s point is that neither of 
these alternatives is philosophically accurate. To understand and to be 
able to recognize a natural harbour, we have to understand what part it 
plays within a certain culture. The significance of an expression or a con-
cept in language cannot be understood as idle. The meaning of a certain 
place is formed through ways of living, through action, strife, intentions, 
choices etc. If we are at a loss with the concept of a natural harbour then 
we are probably not part of a seafaring culture. We could not then dis-
cern such a place in nature, as for us the place would probably only sig-
nify wilderness. This would mean that we could not then feel confident 
at sea during heavy weather. This does not however imply that we could 
not understand the importance of the concept. We can understand what 
it would mean to be in need of a safe haven at sea during heavy weather 
and we can understand that achieving this goal would require a certain 
skill of being able to identify a place as suitable for anchoring up, a place 
that offers shelter from winds etc. We are not at a loss with understand-
ing the predicament of a culture that earns its living at sea etc., since we 
are not at a loss with what it means to struggle, to seek safety or to secure 
a living. Then we have something to start from, if we want to under-
stand the concept of a natural harbour. Meloe writes: “The method of 
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investigating the concept of a harbour, therefore, is this: Situate yourself 
within the practice that this object belongs to, and then investigate the 
object and its contribution to that practice.”30 
In order for something to be a natural harbour, it has to have certain 
qualities. Our perception or our concepts cannot create these qualities in 
a material landscape. In order to recognize such a place, one has to under-
stand a culture of seafaring and its relation to certain aspects of the land-
scape and in order to do so one has to be acquainted with the practice of 
sailing, fishing, etc. For example, a natural harbour is: “at least 4 metres 
deep, at low tide, its bottom should be of a material that will hold an an-
chor even if the wind is pressing against the boat with the force of a storm, 
and its surroundings of skerries or islands should be such as to make it 
possible to approach it in most sorts of weather.”31 To be able to see this 
requires a certain life-form, a certain kind of experience and understand-
ing of what exactly is required of these qualities of the geographical struc-
ture of a certain place. The natural harbour does not exist there a priori in 
nature. Without the activity and life form of the fisherman, Meloe writes, 
“there are no such formations to be seen, since there are then no eyes to see 
them. […] If there are no fishermen, or other seafaring people, seeking ref-
uge from foul weather, then there are no havens.”32 In order to understand 
a certain place and landscape, we have to be in contact with those cultures 
and societies who can appreciate this landscape, for which this place has a 
purpose, for which a certain place, perhaps foreign in our eyes, is a home. 
It requires that we understand what certain words, concepts and sentences 
mean in a lived life, in another person’s experience. 
Meloe’s example shows how the question concerning design does not 
address the fundamental issue. Even a completely natural place like the 
natural harbour is not beyond human interest. To somebody this place 
might be pristine, virginal or meaningless. To a fisherman it is a haven, 
something that is required for his way of living. Neither of these attitudes 
is determined solely by the place itself. It becomes a harbour through a 
way of relating to it and it becomes wilderness through an other way of re-
lating to it. But beyond these relations this place is nothing. As Nietzsche 
points out, the distinction does not run between a world of appearance 
and a real world, but between a world and nonentity.33
The usual way of describing problems concerning our contemporary 
attitudes toward nature still relies on the classical aesthetic discussion. The 
romantic view holds that our involvement with nature, our conceptual-
ization of the natural and our ordering of the natural landscape according 
to our economical, utilitarian interests, is always a way of domesticating 
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the wilderness. In a moral sense, in this view, the interference with nature 
is always a form of exploitation. The core idea of the romantic view is that 
human beings must respect the natural and succumb to this order. When 
the common belief in a divine natural order gives way to modernity, the 
original idea of nature as it exists for itself becomes superfluous. Still, the 
question of power and domestication remains, but in a different sense. 
Evidently we have altered the state of nature and the consequences have 
been horrific. The most pressing issue is that the most fundamental conse-
quences are yet to come. In this sense the idea that we have to stop exploit-
ing nature is still valid. However there is no return to an original state. 
My main goal in this text is to point out another way of addressing the 
problem. Despite our efforts to control, transform or domesticate nature, 
we are still part of this ecosystem. Whether we consider ourselves to be 
at home in nature or alienated from it, we cannot transcend it. We can-
not domesticate something which is already domestic and consequently 
we cannot consider our involvement in nature exploitative by definition 
since it is impossible for us to act without this involvement. As in Meloe’s 
example of the natural harbour, we have to adapt to ways of living which 
enable us to, not only survive, but to feel at home in our environment. 
What this would entail cannot be answered in any uniform way. This is 
not my aim. The point is that we have to agree at least on one matter: 
that there is no pre-anthropomorphic natural state, or, rather, whether 
there is one or not, we cannot access it without our human understand-
ing of things. There might exist ideals, fantasies and metaphysical sys-
tems of thought that build upon such a concept of nature-within-itself, 
and we might say that these kinds of ideals have been the core of our 
Western life-form. But it is precisely this ideal that we have to rid our-
selves of. This is the legacy of Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein 
and Heidegger and it is a sound reaction to a romantic ideal that sprung 
from a thorough reorganization of our culture.
Notes
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Thing-in-Itself and Appearance, and The Metaphys-
ical Need,” in Immanuel Kant Critical Assessments, ed. Ruth F. Chadwick (London: 
Routledge, 1992), 82.
2. Jakob Meloe, “Remaking a Form of Life,” in Commonality and Particularity 







6. Nancy Armstrong, Photography in the Age of Fiction (Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: Harvard University Press, 2002), 32–33.
7. Ibid., 57–58.
8. William Cronon, “The Trouble of Wilderness, or, getting Back to the Wrong 
Nature,” in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William 





13. Wordsworth as quoted in Armstrong, 42.




18. Anthony Ashley Cooper Earl of Shaftesbury, The Moralists, A Philosophical 
Rhapsody (London: John Wyatt 1709), 207.
19. Jerome Stolnitz, “On the Significance of lord Shaftesbury in Modern Aes-
thetic Theory”, The Philosophical Quarterly 11, no 43 (1961), 98.
20. Chronologically this is evident if we take into account that Shaftesbury made 
his contributions prior to Baumgarten who commonly is considered to be the fa-
ther of modern aesthetics. However this issue is more complex if we look at the 
philosophical concepts involved. Shaftesbury can also be considered to be the first 
modern aesthetician due to the fact that he introduced the concept of disinter-
estedness into philosophy. It is this idea that later will be refined by Kant and 
Shopenhauer and it is the questions concerning the disinterested attitude that fi-
nally will pave the way for a purely aesthetic discipline within philosophy. For a 
discussion on this issue, see Preben Mortensen, “Shaftesbury and the morality of 
Art Ap preciation,” Journal of the History of Ideas 55, no. 4 (1994), 632–633.
21. Ibid., 636.
22. Shaftesbury, 205.





27. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception (New York: Routledge, 
2005), 43.
Environmental Aesthetics Beyond the Dialectics of Interest and Disinterest
105
28. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2002), 27.
29. Merleau-Ponty 2005, 55.






Armstrong, Nancy. Photography in the Age of Fiction: The Legacy of British Real-
ism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002.
Cronon, William. “The Trouble of Wilderness, or, getting Back to the Wrong Na-
ture”. http://www.williamcronon.net/writing/Trouble_with_Wilderness_Main.
html. Originally published in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place 
in Nature, ed. William Cronon, 69–90. New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1995. 
Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Judgement. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988.
Meloe, Jakob. “The Two Landscapes of Northern Norway.” Inquiry 31 (1988): 
387–401.
Meloe, Jakob. “Remaking a Form of Life.” In Commonality and Particularity in 
Ethics, ed. Lilli Alanen, Sara Heinämaa and Thomas Wallgren. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1997.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Routledge, 2002.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The World of Perception. New York: Routledge, 2005.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “The Thing-in-Itself and Appearance, and The Metaphysi-
cal Need.” In Immanuel Kant Critical Assessments, ed. Ruth F. Chadwick, 
80–88. London: Routledge.
Mortensen, Preben. “Shaftesbury and the morality of Art Appreciation.” Journal 
of the history of Ideas 55, no. 4 (1994): 631–650.
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of. The Moralists, A Philosophical 





Stolnitz, Jerome. “On the Significance of lord Shaftesbury in Modern Aesthetic 
Theory.” The Philosophical Quarterly 11, no. 43 (1961): 97–113.
